

Health Economy

Choice, Commerce, and Conflict
Ryan Doody

Contents:

Review: Public Goods
Asymmetric Information
Adverse Selection,
Insurance, & Obamacare

Market Failure: Public Goods

Expect:

Underproduction

Why?

1. Free Rider Problem
2. Assurance Problem

What can be done?



Market Failure: Public Goods



Market Failure: Public Goods

Expect:

Underproduction

Why?

1. Free Rider Problem
2. Assurance Problem



What can be done?

Non-rival & Non-excludable

Example: Pandemics & Public Goods

Example of Public Goods?

Cowen argued (in 2013) that our health care policies were not ideal for dealing with pandemics.

Why?

Example of Public Goods?

Cowen argued (in 2013) that our health care policies were not ideal for dealing with pandemics.

Why?

Our current health care policies are not optimal for dealing with pandemics. The central problem is that these policies neglect what economists call "public goods": items and services that benefit many people and can't easily be withheld from those who don't pay for them directly.

Protection against communicable diseases is a core example of a public good, as is basic scientific research, which can yield new ideas that may be spread at very low additional cost. (In contrast, Medicare, which is publicly financed, has some elements of a public good, but any particular expenditure tends to benefit an individual receiving treatment, rather than being spread over a number of beneficiaries.)

Solutions to Public Goods?

Solutions to Public Goods?

Focusing government on the production of public goods may sound like a trivial issue, too obvious to be worth a mention. But, in fact, we have been failing at it, and the consequences could be serious indeed.

Solutions: Government Intervention

Because of **Free Riders**, the market will underproduce public goods.

Solution: Government provides them.

How does this work? Taxes.

Solutions: Government Intervention

Because of **Free Riders**, the market will underproduce public goods.

Solution: Government provides them.

How does this work? Taxes.

Problem: The Forced Rider Problem

Solutions: Government Intervention

The Forced Rider Problem

People are forced to contribute to the production of some good whether or not they want it.

Information Problem

How do we know which Public Goods to produce?
(Voting? Gathering information? Both are *themselves* Public Goods.)

Market Failure: Solutions?

What are some other solutions?

- Commitment Contracts
- Bundling (e.g., advertisements)
- Make excludable
- Others?



Asymmetric Information

Market Failure

Causes of Market Failures:

- Externalities
- Non-excludability
- **Asymmetric information**
- Transaction costs



ARGUMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE CLAIM

- P₁ X would be voluntarily exchanged for Y only if the person who has X (Person A) prefers having Y to having X and the person who has Y (Person B) prefers having X to having Y ($Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$).
- P₂ If $Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$ then both A's and B's preferences are better satisfied by engaging in the transaction than by not.
- P₃ Satisfying a preference makes one better-off.
- P₄ No one else is affected by the exchange.
-
- C If X is voluntarily exchanged for Y, then the participants of the exchange are made better-off and no one is made worse-off.

ARGUMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE CLAIM

- P1** X would be voluntarily exchanged for Y only if the person who has X (Person A) prefers having Y to having X and the person who has Y (Person B) prefers having X to having Y ($Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$).
- P2** If $Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$ then both A's and B's preferences are better satisfied by engaging in the transaction than by not.
- P3** Satisfying a preference makes one better-off.
- P4** No one else is affected by the exchange.

C If X is voluntarily exchanged for Y, then the participants of the exchange are made better-off and no one is made worse-off.

ARGUMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE CLAIM

- P1** X would be voluntarily exchanged for Y only if the person who has X (Person A) prefers having Y to having X and the person who has Y (Person B) prefers having X to having Y ($Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$).
- P2** If $Y \succ_A X$ and $X \succ_B Y$ then both A's and B's preferences are better satisfied by engaging in the transaction than by not.
- P3** Satisfying a preference makes one better-off.
- P4** No one else is affected by the exchange.

C If X is voluntarily exchanged for Y, then the participants of the exchange are made better-off and no one is made worse-off.

Asymmetric Information

Economic transaction involves *asymmetric information* when one party to the transaction has more information about it than the other.

Examples:

Used car sales
Finance
Health insurance
Etc.



Asymmetric Information


George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.



Asymmetric Information

George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.

Used Car Market:



Asymmetric Information

George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.


Used Car Market:



Asymmetric Information

George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.

Used Car Market:



Asymmetric Information

George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.

Used Car Market:



Asymmetric Information

George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.

Used Car Market:

What's causing the problem? What can be done to help?



Asymmetric Information


George Akerlof's theory of *Adverse Selection*.

Used Car Market:

What's causing the problem? What can be done to help?




Uncertainty & Medical Care



Kenneth Arrow

American Economist
1921-2017



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Postscript

I wish to repeat here what has been suggested above in several places: that the failure of the market to insure against uncertainties has created many social institutions in which the usual assumptions of the market are to some extent contradicted. The medical profession is only one example, though in many respects an extreme one. All professions share some of the same properties. The economic importance

Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care"

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Arrow identifies several sources of uncertainty / asymmetric information in the health care sector.

Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care"

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Arrow identifies several sources of uncertainty / asymmetric information in the health care sector.

- Patient/Doctor Relationship
- Health Insurance

Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care"

Patient/Doctor Relationship

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Patient/Doctor Relationship

Doctors have better information about health conditions and interventions than patients.



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Patient/Doctor Relationship

Doctors have better information about health conditions and interventions than patients.

What Can Be Done?

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Patient/Doctor Relationship

Doctors have better information about health conditions and interventions than patients.

What Can Be Done?

Quality Assurance with **licensing**

Relationship of **trust** between doctors and patients

Health Insurance

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.



Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.

What Can Be Done?

Uncertainty & Medical Care

Health Insurance Market

Consumers have better information about their health than insurers.

What Can Be Done?



Obamacare



Obamacare




The Affordable Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare”), 2010:

- Subsidizes the cost of buying insurance
- Disallows insurance companies to discriminate based on pre-existing conditions
- The Individual Mandate: everyone must purchase health insurance

Obamacare

The Affordable Care Act

- Subsidizes the cost of health insurance for low-income Americans
- Disallows insurance companies from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions
- The Individual Mandate: everyone must purchase health insurance



Obamacare

The Affordable Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare”), 2010:

- **The Individual Mandate:** everyone must purchase health insurance

Challenged by the court (2012); upheld as a tax

Tax was made 0% in 2017.

New court challenge



Obamacare

LAW

Obamacare Wins For The 3rd Time At The Supreme Court

Updated June 17, 2021 - 5:05 PM ET ⓘ
Heard on Morning Edition



Challenged by the court (2012); upheld as a tax
Tax was made 0% in 2017.
New court challenge



Obamacare

LAW

Obamacare Wins For The 3rd Time At The Supreme Court

Updated June 17, 2021 - 5:05 PM ET ⓘ
Heard on Morning Edition



We haven't seen an insurance market “death spiral”.
Why not?



Moral Hazard

Moral Hazard

When you have an **incentive** to increase your exposure to risk because you no longer stand to suffer the **full costs** of that risk.



Moral Hazard

When you have an **incentive** to increase your exposure to risk because you no longer stand to suffer the **full costs** of that risk.

Principal-Agent Problem

One person (the “agent”) is able to make decisions on behalf of another (the “principal”). Their interests may diverge.



Moral Hazard

When you have an **incentive** to increase your exposure to risk because you no longer stand to suffer the **full costs** of that risk.

Principal-Agent Problem

One person (the “agent”) is able to make decisions on behalf of another (the “principal”). Their interests may diverge.

Insurance can create *moral hazards*.



Moral Hazard

When you have an incentive to increase your exposure to risk

b
P
C
d
T
It

TOO BIG TO FAIL

MORAL HAZARD

What Do You
Think?

